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Abstract: 
Immanuel Kant is by far one of the most influential philosophers of modern times whose 
richness of though spans the entire spectrum of philosophy and beyond. He had written much 
on metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, political philosophy, logic and of course on 
other disciplines such as mathematics and geography (Kaufmann 363). Born in 1974 at 
Konigsberg where he studied and later became a professor in it University, Kant was said to 
have lived a monotonous and routine-kind of life to the point of boredom. He died in 1804. 
This paper examines Kant’s conception of space and time and its implication for the theory of 
knowledge. The point will be made that Kant’s position leads us to skepticism. In other 
words, going by the position of Kant, the human mind cannot acquire true or certain 
knowledge. Thus, his position is rejected and argument to is presented to show that the mind 
is capable of true knowledge even beyond the bounds of space and time. 
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The Notion of Space and Time Before Kant   
 Before Kant quite a number of philosophers had looked at the problem of space and 
time. For instance, Aristotle rejected the idea of the existence of space, that is vacuum. For 
him, “it is inconceivable that space should exist, because space must be filled with matter to 
transmit physical effects by direct contract” (Crowe, 104). The concept of space has often 
been conceived in consonance with the concept of time. Space is used to refer to the whole 
area in which things exist and move (Hornby 1139). However, space is also defined as the 
amount of an area of a place that is empty or that is available for use. This latter conception 
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of space is seen to be immediately rejected by Parmenides who thought that to say empty 
space exists would be to say that what is not, exists. Lacey says that the notion of empty 
space supports that of time without change. “This however has been more generally rejected” 
(326). In ordinary, unscientific term, space is understood as an “in-between, a differentiating 
distance between one body and another” (Iroegbu 42). In other words, space is more of a 
connection between things that a thing as such. Space is the link between different realities in 
their connectedness with one another. 
 Time on the other hand is seen as the record of succession of events, bodies and other 
occurrence in the universe by the human mind. This succession involves three levels of 
temporality and historicity, namely, past, present and future. Edet appears to agree with the 
above view of time. According to him, “we speak of time when we refer to a sequence of 
events or their duration. Events are fundamental to time” (3). For the realist, time is a 
posteriori. By this it is meant that, time is nothing but the relationship between events. In fact, 
when St. Augustine asked “what then is time”, he was expressing his perplexity in grapping 
with a notion of time. In answer he declared, “if no one asks of me, I know, if I wish to 
explain to him who asks, I know not” (Augustine 264). Time is thus independent of human 
consciousness. Human beings can only try to determine its rate or flow, but cannot make time 
flow faster or slower. 
 
Kant’s Epistemology 
 Kant’s idea of space and time is drawn from his epistemic and metaphysical views, 
and hence, differs both from ordinary sense and that of most philosophers. It is in Kant that 
one finds a clear case of the interrelatedness of epistemology and metaphysics. This explains 
why Kant’s Epistemological views are deeply interwoven with his metaphysical views. 
 In his theory of knowledge, Kant believes that not all knowledge derives from 
experience, though they many begin from experience. This was his response to one of the 
basic questions of epistemology which the rationalists and empiricists contended with, 
namely, what is the source of human knowledge? In the words of Kant, there can be no doubt 
that all our knowledge begins with experience, yet it by no means follows that all arise out of 
experience” (41). To further buttress his point, Kant identified two operations by which 
human knowledge derives. These he called sensibility and understanding. By sensibility he 
means, the capacity of the mind to passively receive the contents of sense perception or 
intuition. Understanding on the other hand, is the active power of thinking about the object of 
sense-perception. 
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 In other words, sensation, sense perception or intuition presents us with raw materials 
of knowledge from the external world, while thought or understanding activity reflects upon 
these raw materials to give rise to knowledge. With this, Kant felt he has been able to bridge 
the gap between the empiricists and the rationalist by showing the important roles of each in 
the process of knowledge acquisition. It was this belief that led to his insistence that a 
synthetic a priori knowledge is possible. By synthetic a priori, Kant meant the type of 
knowledge or proposition which though related to experience are not derived from experience 
yet cannot be contradicted by experience. “They are synthetic and at the same time a priori” 
(Omoregbe epistemology 12). Thus, as Howell rightly avers, “although our sensibility and 
understanding are thus utterly distinct faculties of the mind, Kant is of course famous for 
holding …the basic position that our human knowledge of object require the use of both these 
faculties and of the intuitive and conceptual representations proper to them” (7). It is much 
the same view that Sahakian expresses when he quotes Kant as saying that: 
 
Thoughts without content are empty, perceptions without 
conceptions are blind understanding can perceive nothing, the 
senses can think nothing. Knowledge anises only from their united 
action (171). 
  
It is perhaps, worth mentioning that, though Kant appreciates t he combined effort of both 
sensation and reason in human understanding, he appears to express more confidence in the 
power and ability of the mind as the seat of reason. Thus, Kant posits that it is the object of 
external world which conforms to the categories of the mind and not otherwise. Hence, the 
mind in Kant’s epistemic metaphysics becomes very active and the arbiter or determiner of 
what should pass a knowledge. “This is his Copernican revolution” (Blackburn, 80). Based 
on this, Kant introduces his concept of space and time and how it relates to what we can and 
cannot know. 
 
Kant’s Notion of Space and Time 
 As stated earlier, Kant’s notion of space and time stems from his epistemology. Space 
and time according to Kant are the two forms or frameworks in which perception takes place. 
Following Kant’s line of thought exposed earlier, all sense perceptions take place in time and 
space without which it cannot take place. Space and time are necessary conditions for sense 
perception to take place. Kant believes that the human mind is of the nature no sense 
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perception can take place. Kant believes that the human mind is of the nature that no sense 
perception can take place and no object can appear to use except in time and space. 
Thus, Kant defines space as that subjective condition of sensibility by which external 
objects appear to us. He believes that we cannot imagine a non-existing space. All we can 
imagine is an empty space; that is, a space that exist with nothing in it. Space is a prior as it is 
not derived from experience. It is one, eternal and all embracing. Nothing apart from 
phenomena (things as they appear) are represented to us in space. Things as they are in 
themselves (Noumena) cannot be perceived by human mind and are not represented in space. 
 Kant also conceived of time as he did space. Time for him, is also necessary, and 
subjective condition for sense perception. It is not a property inherent in things and does not 
exist of itself. It also a prior, it is only in that any thing can be perceived as phenomena and 
existing in succession or at the same time with another. Like space, there can be time without 
any phenomena, but there can never be anything without connection with time. Time is thus 
one and all embracing. For Kant “The idea of motion and change is meaningful only in time” 
(Gorden 1050). However, while space is the subjective necessary condition for our external 
experience, time is the subjective necessary condition for our internal experience. 
 Hence, he defines time as the form of the internal sense or state. It is only things that 
appear that are in time, not all things are found in time except things that are phenomenon. 
On the other hand, things as they are in themselves are not given in time. Time according to 
Kant is nothing when considered in itself. It cannot exist as an entity outside the human mind, 
hence, it is only in relation to the human mind that time can be conceived to exist. To the 
question is time unreal? Kant says “Time when considered in itself is unreal, because it has 
no independent existence as an objective entity” (Omoregbe Modern, 94). Thus, time is 
unreal, yet is real when considered empirically in relation to objects of sense perception as no 
object can be experienced by man without coming under the condition of time. 
 As stated earlier, knowledge is acquired by the joint operation of two faculties – sense 
perception (sensibility) and understanding (thought). These two faculties operate under some 
a prior conditions; time and space. The faculty of thought (undemanding) also has its own a 
prior conditions of operation. Concerning the functions of these faculties, Kant held that 
while the sense perception receives data, the though synthesizes the content of sense 
perception. The faculty of thought is also called judgment and its apron condition of 
operation is called categories which are pure a prior concepts constituting the rules of 
thinking by which the faculty of thinking operates. The function of understanding is the 
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function of judgment is to discover the function of understanding. Also to know the different 
kinds of judgment is to know the categories of understanding. 
 Thus, Kant asserts that when the content of a judgment is analysed it will be found to 
have four functions with three forms (moments) each. Here, Kant argues that if we can find 
all the forms of judgment then we can also find all the categories of understanding which also 
has four forms with three sub-forms each. The forms of judgment are: 
 
1. Quantity: Universal, particular, singular 
2. Quality: Affirmation, negative, infinite 
3. Relations: Categorical, Hypothetical, disjunction  
4. Modality: Problematic, Apodictic, assertive (Kant 107)      
 
These forms of judgment correspond to the categories of understanding which are as follows: 
Quantity: Unity, plurality, singular  
Quality: Reality, negation, limitation  
Relation: Substance/accident   
 
Cause/Effect 
Community/ reciprocity (Kant, 113). 
 The above according to Kant are the categories of human understanding. By this he 
meant that they are a prior concepts, principles or rules by which we think and by which 
anything can be thought or conceived of. This simply means that it is only by these categories 
that knowledge can be acquired or any object known. The categories reveal the structure of 
understanding. Things can be known only when the categories have been applied to it. This 
implies that things cannot be known in themselves except as the categories present them to 
us. It follows therefore that the categories can only apply to objects of sense-perception 
which are phenomena and they appear in space and time. 
 So only objects existing in space and time and appearing as phenomena that can pass 
through the application of the categories of sense-perception and outside space and time 
because they are not objects of human knowledge as they are outside the bounds of human 
understanding and knowledge. 
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Implications for the Theory of Knowledge   
 Kant’s epistemological exposition of the concept of space and time has some 
implications for knowledge acquisition. One of the implications of our forms of intuition 
restraining us to spatio-temporal reality for metaphysics and in effect for epistemology is that, 
it makes the mind and its categories the subjective criterion by which truth or knowledge is 
known. Whatever the mind tells us reality is, is to be accepted as so. Subjectivity is a 
philosophical view that denies the existence of objective knowledge or truth. It holds that 
truth or knowledge is dependent on the individual or the subject and not on the object. For 
Lacey “subjectivism says that certain utterances do express objective truths, but only about 
human minds, wishes, beliefs, experiences etc whether they be of the speaker or of the people 
in general (333). In other words, in subjectivity, whatever appears to be objective truths or 
rules in certain spheres are really disguised commands or expressions of attitude. 
 Following this, one of Kant’s major aim, which is to show what objective knowledge 
man can acquire and by what means, is defeated as he presents us with personal subjective 
knowledge of truth and reality. The subjectivity implies in Kant’s metaphysics is occasioned 
by his conception of the human mind. He gave the mind (reason) such an autonomous, self 
subsisting and independent role that it becomes the abiter and decider of truth and 
authenticity criterion. The mind has to restructure the world and present same to us as truth or 
knowledge within the bounds of space and time. One thing can be deduced from the 
foregoing, and that is the fact that truth or knowledge is neither objective nor certain. There is 
no one absolute or objective truth or knowledge which human mind can and do aspire to 
grasp. Rather what is the case by virtue of Kant’s position are truth or knowledge as given to 
man through the mind. Hence, as there are different men with different minds, so are there 
different and numerous truths and knowledge about a given aspect of reality. What Kant 
appears to have done here is to project his personal-individual subjective understanding of the 
world as authentic knowledge of reality. This may not encourage the growth of metaphysics 
and indeed the entire body of knowledge. 
 Again, despite the rigorous process involved before truth can be arrived at, Kant, by 
introducing the concepts of Noumena and Phenomena made it explicitly clear the aspect of 
reality we can know and the aspect we cannot know. Now, Kant bifurcated reality into two, 
namely, things in themselves (Noumena) and things as they appear (Phenomena). This can be 
likened to Plato’s division of the world into the world of appearance (knowledge of which 
our senses can attain) and the world of form (where there is absolute knowledge and only 
mathematical and philosophical reasoning can attain it). Kant on his own part conceived that 
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only the phenomena can be known by man’s cognitive faculty because it lies within the 
bounds of space and time. While Noumena cannot be known by virtue of their being beyond 
space and time. This position, led Kant to reject metaphysics as impossible and by extension 
epistemology (considering the relationship between metaphysics and epistemology). 
 Kant believes that this is all that metaphysicians do that create problem for them. 
They strive always to apply the mind and its categories to investigate things outside space 
and time. This, he believes, leads to nothing but illusion. What should be clear here in that 
Kant’s position leads us to skepticism. Skepticism holds that we can never know the true 
nature of things. All we know is the way things appear to us, not the way they really are. 
Since things appear differently to different people, there is no objectivity in knowledge, no 
certainty, since each person can only say the way things appear to him. “No body can say the 
way really are; nobody knows and nobody can know” (Omoregbe knowing 135). 
 In view of these constraints placed on human mind and its principles, categories and 
faculties of knowing by Kant, one cannot rightly make any epistemic claim. One cannot 
claim to know anything for certain except as it appears to him through the sense and within 
space and time. Again, this does not encourage the growth of knowledge and epistemology in 
particular. It is true that skepticism is believed to have led to foundationalism among other 
things in epistemology, which is aimed at laying a solid foundation for knowledge that is able 
to refute the skeptical challenge; the fact remains that, skepticism has done more harm than 
good to the theory of knowledge. going by the skeptical challenge, every effort by man’s 
mind in whatever discipline or endeavour to acquire or arrive at true and certain knowledge is 
a fruitless venture that ends in uncertainty. One begins to wonder how Hume’s skepticism 
had awaken Kant from his dogmatic slumber when he eventually fell into the same 
skepticism on the long run. Thus, one agrees with Allais when she says “the interpretation I 
favour, sees Kant as committed to seeing appearances as genuinely independent in some 
sense and also sees him as committed do there actually being an aspect of reality which we 
cannot have knowledge” (2).  
It must be noted, however, that the skeptical position and in particular Kantian 
skepticism in the light of his spatio-temporal limitation of human cognition, is hardly tenable. 
Human mind can acquire certain and absolute knowledge and it is not circumscribed by how 
we know it as Kant posits. For instance, in African epistemic circle, “what we know as 
inseparable from how we know it” (Okolo 17). In the process of acquiring knowledge, the 
rational, empirical, revelational, spiritual and material methods to arrive at absolute and 
genuine knowledge. 
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Apart from this, following the meaning of metaphysics as the “science of being as 
being, by which it is meant that the object of metaphysics is all reality, visible and invisible-
whatever exists” (Coreth 19), the mind can apprehend by means of metaphysical reflection or 
investigation all aspects of reality in so far as they exist whether they be visible 
(phenomena/world of appearance) or invisible (Noumena/world of forms). If this is not the 
case. One would have to ask, how Kant got the idea of the existence of Noumena (things in 
themselves) if his mind with all of its cognitive apparatus, did not give him the knowledge of 
the existence of such aspect of reality, as to have categorically stated that it lies beyond space 
and time. 
This is more so when it is reckoned that the idea o space and time allows the 
traditional African to articulate the universality, coherence and absoluteness of reality. By 
this, it is meant that, contrary to Kant’s position, the African fuses the idea of physical space 
and time of everyday experience with the idea of transcendent space and time in order to have 
a coherent and holistic knowledge of reality. This assertion receives credence from the 
following words. 
Space and time form one continuum and aspects of the totality that 
forms the material and the immaterial, the living and the dead in a 
way that is existentially relevant. That is to say, this traditional 
African philosopher was able to transpose the idea of physical space 
of every day experience into a transcendent space that extended 
beyond the physical into the realm of the supernatural (Asouzu, 166). 
 
Conclusion  
 The foregoing has been an attempt to examine the implications of Kant’s notion of 
time and space for the theory of knowledge. Kant’s epistemology from where his notion of 
space and time was drawn was briefly exposed to aid an understanding of his conception of 
the two concepts.  The central question of this discourse has been; is man’s knowledge of 
reality circumscribed by space and time, outside which nothing can be known? Kant’s 
response to the above question was shown to be inimical to the growth of epistemology and 
the entire edifice of knowledge, because it leads inevitably to subjectivism which in turn 
leads to skepticism. 
 Hence, it was argued against Kant, that based on the understanding of metaphysics as 
the science whose central object is all reality whether it be visible or invisible in so far as it 
exist. Man can attain knowledge of reality even beyond the spatio-temporal world. Moreover, 
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Kant’s recognition of the fact that the mind has the tendency or inclination of always going 
beyond space and time therefore towards what he called “illusions”, is an indication that man 
can acquire knowledge beyond the phenomenal world. 
 Thus, the position was held that space and time are both real and ideal and human 
mind can apprehend reality both within and outside space and time in so far as it exists. 
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